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One of the most dramatic economic transformations of the past century has been the entry of women
into the labor force. While many theories explain why this change took place, we investigate the process
of transition itself. We argue that local information transmission generates changes in participation
that are geographically heterogeneous, locally correlated and smooth in the aggregate, just like those
observed in our data. In our model, women learn about the effects of maternal employment on children
by observing nearby employed women. When few women participate in the labor force, data is scarce
and participation rises slowly. As information accumulates in some regions, the effects of maternal
employment become less uncertain, and more women in that region participate. Learning accelerates,
labor force participation rises faster, and regional participation rates diverge. Eventually, information
diffuses throughout the economy, beliefs converge to the truth, participation flattens out and regions
become more similar again. To investigate the empirical relevance of our theory, we use a new county-level
data set to compare our calibrated model to the time-series and geographic patterns of participation.
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lveldkam@stern.nyu.eduOver the twentieth century, there has been a dramatic rise in female labor force participation in
the United States. Many theories of this phenomenon have been proposed. Some of them emphasize
the role played by market prices and technological factors; others focus on the role played by policies
and institutions, and a few recent ones investigate the role of cultural factors. All of them, however,
focus on aggregate shocks that explain why the transition took place and abstract from the local
interactions that could explain how the transition took place.
We use new data and theory to argue that women's labor force participation decisions rely
on information that is transmitted from one woman to another, located nearby. The local nature
of information transmission smooths the e®ects of changes in the environment and generates ge-
ographically heterogeneous, but locally correlated reactions, like those observed in our data. Our
theory focuses on learning and participation of women with children, because this sub-group is
responsible for most of the rise in participation. A crucial factor in mothers' participation decisions
is the e®ect of employment on their children. However, this e®ect is uncertain. The uncertainty
makes risk-averse women less likely to participate. Learning resolves their uncertainty, causing
participation to rise.
In our overlapping generations model, women learn from their neighbors about the relative
importance of nature (innate ability) and nurture (the role of maternal employment) in determin-
ing children's outcomes (section 1). Women inherit their parents' beliefs and update them after
observing the outcomes of neighboring women in the previous generation. Those outcomes reveal
information about the e®ect of maternal employment only if those nearby mothers were employed.
Section 2 shows that higher local participation generates more information, which reduces uncer-
tainty about the e®ect of maternal employment and makes participation of nearby women more
likely. Thus, local participation snowballs and a gradual, but geographically-concentrated rise in
participation rates ensues.
Using county-level U.S. data from 1940-2000, section 3 documents how the growth rate of
women's labor force varied over time and across counties.1 The female labor force grew slowly
1To our knowledge this county-level data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata series has not been explored
before in economics research.
1during the post-war decades, accelerated during the 1970s and 1980s, and recently °attened out,
generating an S-shaped time path. Furthermore, this growth was uneven across geographic regions:
High participation rates emerged ¯rst in a few geographic centers and spread from there to nearby
regions, over the course of several decades. This process gave rise to signi¯cant spatial correlation
across the participation rates of US counties that is only marginally explained by common economic
and demographic factors. This residual correlation slowly rose at the beginning of the period,
peaked when aggregate labor force increased fastest and ¯nally declined as aggregate labor force
stagnated. Finally, survey evidence and natural experiments o®er direct evidence of heterogeneity
and changes in beliefs about maternal employment.
Sections 4 and 5 use moments of the labor force participation distribution across US counties
in 1940 to calibrate and simulate a dynamic learning model and explore its quantitative properties.
The results are consistent with the S-shaped evolution of aggregate labor force, and the rise and
fall in the spatial correlation of county-level participation rates. The model generates S-shaped dy-
namics because initially, when uncertainty is high, very few women participate in the labor market;
information about the role of nurture di®uses slowly and beliefs are nearly constant. As informa-
tion accumulates and the e®ects of labor force participation become less uncertain, more women
participate, learning accelerates and labor force participation rises more quickly. As uncertainty is
resolved, beliefs converge to the truth, and participation °attens out.
The local nature of the learning process generates the rise and fall of spatial correlation in
participation. Initially, female labor force participation is low everywhere and the minute di®erences
are spatially uncorrelated. As women in some locations start working, their neighbors observe
them and learn from them. This makes the neighbors more likely to work in the next generation,
generating an increase in geographic heterogeneity and spatial correlation. Eventually as the truth
about maternal employment is learned everywhere, heterogeneity and spatial correlation in local
participation rates falls.
The model provides a simple framework for examining the transition dynamics and geography
of a wide array of social and economic phenomena. Section 6 illustrates this potential by setting
up a model of career choice that predicts patterns of wages and occupational sorting, issues also
2addressed in recent work by Doepke and Zilibotti (2008). Section 7 concludes by describing further
extensions of the model that could capture the e®ects of policy change, heterogeneity among social
groups or the process of cultural change.
Relationship to other theories Many recent papers have explored the rise in female labor
force participation. Among these theories, some focus on changes that a®ect the costs or bene¯ts
of employment for all women: changes in wages, less discrimination, the introduction of household
appliances, the less physical nature of jobs, or the ability to control fertility.2 In contrast, our theory
focuses on why the participation of women with children rose so much faster than the aggregate
participation rate. A complete understanding of the rise in participation requires both pieces, an
explanation of what changed for all women and what made married mothers behave so di®erently.
Another group of theories shares our focus on changes that a®ect mothers speci¯cally, but unlike
our theory, rely on aggregate shocks. For example, the decline in child care costs, the invention
of baby formula, or public news shocks are changes that spread quickly because there are no
geographic barriers or distance-related frictions causing some regions to be una®ected.3 Obviously,
one can modify these theories to introduce geographic heterogeneity by adding income or preference
heterogeneity.4 What is harder to explain is why the participation transition happened at di®erent
times in di®erent places. The rates of change in participation were vastly di®erent across counties,
resulting in a rise and then a fall in the cross-county dispersion of participation rates. This is not
a pattern that a typical aggregate shock would generate.
One would think that any local coordination motive (e.g. social pressure) or thick market
externality (e.g. child care markets) could generate local di®erences in the speed of transition.
But such a coordination model typically predicts a simultaneous switch from a low-participation
2See Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2005), Goldin and Katz (2002), and Goldin (1990), Jones, Manuelli,
and McGrattan (2003) on nature of jobs.
3See Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2008) and Del Boca and Vuri (2007) for child care costs, Albanesi
and Olivetti (2007) for baby formula, Fern¶ andez and Fogli (2005), Antecol (2000) and Fern¶ andez, Fogli, and Olivetti
(2004) on the role of cultural change, and Fern¶ andez (2007) for an aggregate information-based learning theory. Note
that this work was done independently and was published as Minneapolis Federal Reserve Sta® Working paper #386,
prior to Fern¶ andez (2007).
4See Fuchs-Schundeln and Izem (2007) for a static theory of geographic heterogeneity in labor productivity between
East and West Germany.
3to a high-participation outcome, unless there is some friction preventing perfect coordination. Our
local information externality generates locally correlated behavior, while the imperfect nature of
the information is the friction that prevents perfect economy-wide coordination.
A third strand of related literature, on technology di®usion, does not focus on labor force
participation, but does consider the geographic di®usion of information (see e.g. Munshi (2004)).
One way to interpret our message is that ideas about how technology di®uses should be applied
to female labor force participation. In this case, the technology being learned about is outsourcing
the care of one's children. Of course, the spread of more traditional technologies like washing
machines and dishwashers could also explain the geographic di®usion of participation. But, such
technologies di®used throughout the country in the span of a decade or two. Part of the puzzle
this paper wrestles with is isolating the information frictions that make learning about maternal
employment so much slower than learning about consumer technologies.5
Facts about geographic heterogeneity do not prove that aggregate changes are irrelevant. Rather,
they suggest such changes operate in conjunction with a mechanism that causes their e®ect to dis-
seminate gradually across the country. We argue that this mechanism is the local transmission
of information. Considering how beliefs react to changing circumstances and how these beliefs, in
turn, a®ect participation decisions can help us understand and evaluate the e®ects of many other
important changes to the bene¯ts and costs of labor force participation.
1 The Model
In this section, we develop a theory in which the dramatic change in female labor force participation
emerges solely as the result of local interactions. Because the bulk of the change came from married
women with small children, we focus on their participation. We model local interactions that
transmit information about the e®ect of maternal employment on children.
5In the macro learning literature, our model ¯lls a gap between the literature on S-shaped learning dynamics and
on endogenous information. The S-shaped learning dynamic is similar to the model of Amador and Weill (2006)
where agents learn what their neighbors know while the idea that information is a by-product of economic activity
appears in Veldkamp (2005). The idea that learning is slow because agents only observe outcomes of those near them
is similar to work on government policy contagion by Buera, Monge-Naranjo, and Primiceri (2006).
4The model makes two key assumptions. First, women were initially uncertain about the con-
sequences of maternal employment on their children. The shift from agriculture to industry at
the end of the 19th century changed the nature of work. In agriculture, women allocated time
continuously between work and child-rearing. This was possible because home and work were in
the same location. Industrialization required women who took jobs to outsource their child care.
At that time, the e®ects of outsourcing were unknown. Women held beliefs about those e®ects
which were very uncertain.6
The second key assumption is that learning happens only at the local level from a small number
of observations, as in the Lucas (1972) island model. This allows learning to take place gradually,
over the course of a century. In a richer model, this strong assumption could be relaxed. Appendix
E sets up and simulates a model with multiple types where women need to observe others like
themselves to learn their type-speci¯c cost of maternal employment. For example, professionals do
not learn from seeing hourly workers; urban mothers face di®erent costs than rural ones. Instead
of learning about what the cost of maternal employment is for the average woman, these women
are learning about the di®erence between the average cost and the cost for their type. In this
richer model, women can observe many more signals, as well as aggregate information like the true
aggregate participation rate, and still learn slowly about the cost of maternal employment for their
type. The results of the simple model below are nearly identical this richer model.
Preferences and Constraints Time is discrete and in¯nite (t = 1;2;:::). We consider an
overlapping generation economy made up of a large ¯nite number of agents living for two periods.
Each agent is nurtured in the ¯rst period and consumes and has one child in the second period of
her life. Preferences of an individual in family i born at time t ¡ 1 depend on their consumption











° > 1 (1)
6This is consistent with the decline in the labor market participation rate of married women observed during
the turn of the century by Goldin (1995), and with the ¯ndings of Mammen and Paxson (2000) who document a
U-shaped relationship between women's labor force rates and development in a cross section of countries.
5This utility function captures the idea that parents care about their child's earning potential, but
not about the choices they make.7
The budget constraint of the individual from family i born at time t ¡ 1 is
cit = nitwit + !it (2)
where !it is an endowment which could represent a spouse's income and nit 2 f0;1g is the discrete
labor force participation choice. If the agent works in the labor force, nit = 1.
The key feature of the model is that an individual's earning potential is determined by a
combination of endowed ability and nurturing, that cannot be perfectly disentangled. Endowed
ability is an unobserved normal random variable ai;t » N(¹a;¾2
a). If a mother stays home with her
child, the child's full natural ability is achieved. If the mother joins the labor force, some unknown
amount µ of the child's ability will be lost. Wages depend exponentially on ability:
wi;t = exp(ai;t ¡ ni;t¡1µ) (3)
Of course, a child also bene¯ts from higher household income when its mother joins the labor
force. While this bene¯t is not explicitly modeled, µ represents the cost to the child of maternal
employment, net of the gain from higher income. The net e®ect could be positive for child welfare.
When we model beliefs, women will not rule out the possibility that employment has a net positive
e®ect on their child's development. Furthermore, appendix D explores a model where all women
initially believe that maternal employment is bene¯cial and shows that uncertainty alone can deter
participation.
Information Sets The constant µ determines the importance of nurture and is not known when
making labor supply decisions. Women have two sources of information about µ: beliefs passed
7Using utility over the future potential wage, rather than recursive utility shuts down an experimentation motive
where mothers participate in order to create information that their decedents can observe. Such a motive makes the
problem both intractable and unrealistic. Most parents do not gamble with their children's future just to observe
what happens.
6down through their family and the wage outcomes of themselves and their neighbors. Agents do
not learn from aggregate outcomes.
Young agents inherit their prior beliefs about µ from their parents' beliefs. In the ¯rst generation,
initial beliefs are identical for all families µi;0 » N(¹0;¾2
0), 8i. Each subsequent generation updates
these beliefs and passes down their updated beliefs to their child. To update beliefs at the beginning
of time t, agents use both potential earnings and parental employment decisions for themselves and
for J ¡ 1 peers. We refer to w as the potential wage because it is observed, regardless of whether
the agent chooses to work.8 Ability a is never observed so that µ can never be perfectly inferred
from observed wages. But, these potential wages are only informative about the e®ect of maternal
employment on wages if a mother actually worked. Note from equation (3) that if ni;t¡1 = 0, then
wi;t only re°ects innate ability and contains no information about µ. Since the content of the signals
in the ¯rst period depends on the previous period's participation rate, the model requires a set of
initial participation decisions ni;0 for each woman i.
The set of family indices for the outcomes observed by agent i is Ji. Spatial location matters in
the model because it determines the composition of the signals in this information set. Each agent
i has a location on a two-dimensional map with indices (xi;yi). Signals are drawn uniformly from
the set of agents within a distance d in each direction: Ji » uniff[xi¡d;xi+d]£[yi¡d;yi+d]gJ¡1.
Agents use the information in observed potential wages to update their prior, according to
Bayes' law. Bayesian updating with J signals is equivalent to the following two-step procedure:
First, run a regression of children's potential wages on parents' labor choices:
W ¡ ¹a = Nµ + "i
where W and N are the J £ 1 vectors flogwj;tgj²Ji and fni;t¡1gj²Ji. Let ¹ ni;t be the sum of the
labor decisions for the set of families that (i;t) observes: ¹ ni;t =
P
j²Ji ni;t. The resulting estimated
coe±cient ^ µ is normally distributed with mean ^ ¹i;t =
P
j²Ji(logwj;t ¡ ¹a)nj;t=¹ ni;t and variance
8This assumption could be relaxed. If wi;t were only observed once agent (i;t) decided to work, then an informative
signal about µ would only be observed if both ni;t = 1 and ni;t¡1 = 1. Since this condition is satis¯ed less frequently,
such a model would make fewer signals observed and make learning slower.
7^ ¾2
i;t = ¾2
a=¹ ni;t. Second, form the posterior mean as a linear combination of the estimated coe±cient











i;t + ^ ¾2
i;t
^ ¹i;t (4)
Posterior beliefs about the value of nurturing are normally distributed µ » N(¹i;t;¾2
i;t). The
posterior precision (inverse of the variance) is the sum of the prior precision and the signal precision.9
Thus posterior variance is
¾2
i;t = (¾¡2
i;t¡1 + ^ ¾¡2
i;t )¡1: (5)
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Equilibrium An equilibrium is a sequence of wages, distributions that characterize beliefs about
µ, work and consumption choices, for each individual i in each generation t such that the following
four conditions are satis¯ed: First, taking beliefs and wages as given, consumption and labor
decisions maximize expected utility (1) subject to the budget constraint (2). The expectation is
conditioned on beliefs ¹i;t;¾i;t. Second, wages of agents born in period t¡1 are consistent with the
labor choice of the parents, as in (3). Third, priors ¹i;t¡1;¾i;t¡1 are equal to the posterior beliefs
of the parent, born at t ¡ 1. Priors are updated using observed wage outcomes Ji;t, according to
Bayes' law (4). Fourth, distributions of elements Ji;t are consistent with distribution of optimal
9The fact that another woman's mother chose to work is potentially an additional signal. But the information
content of this signal is very low because the outside observer does not know whether this person worked because they
were highly able, very poor, less uncertain or had low expectations for the value of theta. Since these observations
contain much more noise than wage signals, and the binary nature of the working decision makes updating much
more complicated, we approximate beliefs by ignoring this small e®ect. We solve an extended model where women
use this extra information in the appendix. Over the 70-year simulation, the extra information increases participation
by 2.4%.
8labor choices ni;(t¡1) and each agent's spatial location.
2 Analytical Results
In this section we establish some cross sectional and dynamic predictions of our theory that dis-
tinguish it from other theories. We begin by solving for the optimal participation decision. Sub-
stituting the budget constraint (2) and the law of motion for wages (3) into expected utility (1)











Taking the expectation over the unknown ability a and the importance of nurture µ delivers expected

































The optimal policy is to join the labor force when the expected utility from employment is greater
than the expected utility from staying home (EUWit > EUOit). De¯ne Nit ´ EUWit ¡ EUOit to
be the expected net bene¯t of labor force participation, conditional on information (¹i;t;¾i;t).
2.1 Comparative statics: The Role of Beliefs, Wages and Wealth
Beliefs The key variable whose evolution drives the increase in labor force participation is beliefs,
and particularly uncertainty. We begin by establishing two intuitive properties of labor force
participation (both derived formally in appendix A). First, a higher expected value of nurture
reduces the probability that a woman will participate in the labor force, holding all else equal.
9The logic of this result appears in equation (8). Increasing the expected value of nurture decreases
the net expected utility of labor force participation: @Ni;t=@¹i;t = ¡¯, times an exponential term,
which is always non-negative. Since ¡¯ < 0, a higher ¹i;t reduces the utility gain from labor force
participation and therefore reduces the probability that a woman will participate.
Second, greater uncertainty about the value of nurture reduces the probability that a woman will
participate in the labor force, holding all else equal. More uncertainty about the cost of maternal
employment on children makes labor force participation more risky. Participation falls because
agents are risk-averse. Over time as information accumulates and uncertainty falls, the net bene¯t
of participating rises: @Ni;t=@¾i;t = (1¡°)¯, times a non-negative (exponential) term. Higher risk
aversion makes (1 ¡ °) more negative and ampli¯es this e®ect.
Thus, there are two ways our model could produce an increase in participation. First, women
could have started with biased, pessimistic beliefs (low ¹0) and participation rates would rise as
women learned that participation is not as bad as they thought. This is the driving force in
Fern¶ andez (2007). Instead, our calibration will give women unbiased beliefs about µ. Our women
will work more over time because they start out uncertain (high ¾0) and learning reduces their
uncertainty. It is possible that some force in the economy caused women around the world to
be systematically deceived about the e®ect maternal employment has on their children. But the
economic transition from agricultural work to the modern age, and the new requirement that
employed women outsource their children's care, undoubtedly created uncertainty.
Wages Wages in our model have standard role: Women work more if wages are higher. While
other theories give wages and human capital a more central role (Olivetti (2006), Goldin and Katz
(1999), Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003)), our baseline model holds the distribution of wages
¯xed. We explore the e®ects of a changing wage process in our technical appendix.
Wealth Greater initial wealth !i;t reduces the probability that a woman will participate in the
labor force. Poorer women join the labor force before richer ones because poorer women have a
higher marginal value of wage income.
102.2 Dynamic Properties
One might think that the initial state after industrialization would be no women participating and
no information being produced and that this would be an absorbing state. The following result
shows that zero participation is a state that can persist for many periods but is exited each period
with a small probability (proof in appendix A.2).
Result 1 In any period where the labor force participation rate is zero (
P
j nj;t¡1 = 0), there is a
positive probability that at least one woman will work in the following period (
P
j nj;t ¸ 1).
All it takes to escape a zero-participation state is for one extremely able woman to be born. She
generates information that makes the women around her less uncertain about the e®ects of maternal
employment. That information encourages these women to work. They, in turn, generate more
information for women around them. Gradually, the information and participation disseminate.
Condition (8) also suggests circumstances in which such a woman is likely to emerge. One
example is a low endowment !jt, which raises the marginal value of labor income. Depressions
or wars, which reduce endowments by eliminating husbands' incomes, can hasten the transition.
Learning ampli¯es those kinds of shocks and causes them to persist long after their direct e®ects
have disappeared. Shocks that cause more women to participate persist through their e®ects on
the information that gets transmitted from generation to generation.
S-shaped Evolution of Participation Rates One of the hallmarks of information di®usion
models is that learning is slow at ¯rst, speeds up, and then slows down again as beliefs converge to
the truth. The concave portion of this S-shaped pattern can be explained by any theory. Because
the participation rate is bounded above by one, any shock to participation must eventually taper
o®. But many shocks to labor force participation would be strongest when they ¯rst hit. The
interesting feature of this model is its prediction that participation will ¯rst rise slowly and then
speed up.
The information gleaned from observing others' labor market outcomes can be described as
a signal with mean ^ ¹i;t =
P
j²Ji(logwj;t ¡ ¹a)nj;t=¹ ni;t and variance ^ ¾2
i;t = ¾2
a=¹ ni;t. Let ½ be the
11fraction of women who participate in the labor force. Then, the expected precision of this signal is
E[^ ¾¡2
i;t ] = ½N¾2
a. A higher signal precision increases the expected magnitude of changes in beliefs.
This conditional variance of t beliefs is the di®erence between prior variance and posterior variance:
var(¹i;tj¹i;t¡1) = ¾2
i;t¡1 ¡ ¾2









i;t > 0, the expected size of revisions is increasing in the precision of the
observed signals and therefore in the fraction of women who work. This is the ¯rst force: As beliefs
change more rapidly, so does labor force participation, early in the century.
The concave part of the S-shaped increase in participation comes later, from convergence of
beliefs to the truth. Over time, new information reduces posterior variance: ¾2
i;t < ¾2
i;t¡1 (equation
5). As posterior variance falls, beliefs change less: @var(¹i;tj¹i;t¡1)=@¾2
i;t¡1 > 0.
Endogenous Pessimism At the start of the transition, there is another force that suppresses
participation: Women become more pessimistic about the bene¯ts of maternal employment, on
average (
R
i ¹i;tdi rises). Women who have pessimistic beliefs (¹i;t¡1 > µ) do not participate and
thus generate less information for their children than women with optimistic beliefs (¹i;t¡1 < µ).
Since new information ^ ¹i;t is unbiased, on average, it moves beliefs toward the the true µ (equation
4). Since the children of pessimistic women observe less new information, their posterior beliefs
remain closer to their prior beliefs. The children of optimistic women revise their beliefs more,
which brings them closer to the truth. Since pessimism is persistent and optimism is undone by
learning, the average belief is pessimistic, until information disseminates fully.
2.3 Geographic Properties
The model produces two e®ects relating to geography: dispersion and spatial correlation in par-
ticipation rates. Di®erences in participation rates come from di®erences in beliefs. Each child's
potential wage is a random realization. Di®erences in these realizations create di®erences in beliefs
12across women. These di®erences are ampli¯ed when women who get information suggesting that
maternal employment is not very costly join the labor force and generate more information for the
women around them. Locations with high mean beliefs generate more information, which lowers
the variance of their beliefs. Both high means and lower variance (less uncertainty) promote higher
labor force participation rates. More participation feeds back by creating more information, which
further reduces the uncertainty and risk associated with maternal employment. Local information
di®usion creates a learning feedback mechanism that ampli¯es the e®ect of small di®erences in
signal realizations.
We formalize this local information e®ect in the following result. Suppose that a woman has
location (xi;yi). De¯ne her region to be the set of agents whose outcomes are in her information
set with positive probability: [xi ¡ d;xi + d] £ [yi ¡ d;yi + d].
Result 2 A woman with an average prior belief who observes average signal draws in a region with
a high participation rate at time t is more likely to participate at time t + 1, all else equal.
Information di®usion makes cross-region dispersion in participation rates rise and then fall. All
women have identical initial prior beliefs by assumption. Dispersion in beliefs is zero. In the limit as
t ! 1, beliefs converge to the truth and their dispersion converges back to zero. In between, beliefs
among women di®er and therefore have positive dispersion. The rise and fall in belief dispersion is
what will create a rise and fall in the dispersion of participation rates.
3 Empirical Evidence: Time Series and Geographic
To examine the transition in female labor force participation predicted by our model, we calibrate
and simulate it. Before turning to those results, this section describes the data and the measures
we use to compare the model to the data. It also presents direct evidence that changing beliefs
played a role in the transition.
133.1 Time Series Evidence
We study the labor force participation behavior of white women over the period 1940-2005 using
data from the US decennial Census and from the Census Bureau's American Community Survey.
Figure 1 reports the labor force participation rate in each decade for women between 25 and 34
years old.10 This implies that the data for each decade comes from a distinct cohort of women.
The increase is quite large: The fraction of women in the labor force rose from one-third in 1940
to nearly 75% in 2005.
However, this increase in the aggregate rate hides large di®erences among subgroups of women.
The increase comes mainly from the change in working behavior of married women with children.
Women without children or unmarried women have always worked in large numbers: In 1940, their
participation rate was already around 60%. On the other hand, the participation rate of married
women with children at that time was only 10% and dramatically increased, reaching 62% in 2005.
Therefore, to understand the large aggregate rise over the period we need to understand what kept
married women with children out of the labor market at the beginning of the period and why their
behavior has changed so dramatically.11
Another interesting feature of the phenomenon that emerges from Figure 1 shows that the
increase took place at di®erent rates over the period: steady but slow in the ¯rst part of the
sample, it signi¯cantly accelerated during the 1970s and 1980s and has recently °attened out,
generating an-S shaped path.
3.2 Geographic Evidence
The geographic predictions of our model are a distinctive feature: The rise of women's labor force
participation started in few locations and gradually spread to nearby areas, as information di®used.
This section explores the geographic patterns of female labor force participation, using county-level
10We exclude women living in institutions. We also exclude individuals living on a farm or employed in agricultural
occupations since agricultural occupations may make working compatible with child-rearing. We also exclude residents
of Alaska and Hawaii. All observations are weighted using the relevant person weights.
11There were also changes in the composition of the population over the period: the fraction of married women
with children (the group with the lowest participation rate), ¯rst increased and then decreased between 1940 and
2005. However, the reduction in the percentage of married women with children, from 53% in 1940 to 45% in 2005,
was too small to account for the observed rise in the aggregate.
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Figure 1: Labor force participation among sub-groups of women.
Details of the data are in appendix B.
U.S. data. The data source is \Historical, Demographic, Economic, and Social Data: The United
States, 1790-2000" produced by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research.
We start our analysis in 1940 because the wage data we need for our calibration begin only in 1940.
There are 3107 U.S. counties in 1940. After eliminating counties with incomplete information over
our entire sample period and excluding Hawaii and Alaska, 3074 counties remain. Our participation
series is the number of working-age females in the civilian labor force, divided by the total working-
age female population. See appendix B for data details.
Figure 2 maps the labor force participation rate for each U.S. county every twenty years. Darker
colors indicate higher levels of female labor force participation. There are three salient features
of the data. First, the levels of labor force participation are not uniform: while the average 1940
participation rate was 18.5%, there were counties with participation rates as low as 4.6% and as high
as 50%. Second, the changes in participation rates are not uniform. While some areas increased
their participation rate dramatically between 1940 and 1960 (for example, the Lake Tahoe region),
others stayed stagnant until the 1980's and witnessed a surge in participation between 1980 and
2000 (for example, southern Minnesota). Third, there is spatial clustering: counties where the
female participation rate is over 40% tend to be geographically close to other such counties. These
counties are concentrated in the foothills of the southern Appalachians (Piedmont region), in the
15North East, Florida, Great Lakes and West coast. Central regions display much lower participation.
To quantify the spatial features of the data and compare those features to the model, we use
two statistics, cross-county dispersion and spatial correlation. For each county i and time t, we ¯rst
estimate LFPit = ¯1t + ¯2tcontrolsit + ²it. As control variables, we use the county's demographic
characteristics, industrial composition and occupational data.12
For dispersion, we compute the standard deviation of the residuals across counties. This is a
measure of geographic heterogeneity not attributable to observable economic features. For spatial
















where N is the number of counties and ¶i;j;d = 1 if counties i and j are within distance d, meaning
that (xj;yj) 2 [xi ¡ d;xi + d] £ [yi ¡ d;yi + d]. This spatial correlation measure is also known as
Moran's I (Moran 1950). It is a measure of local geographic similarity commonly used in ¯elds such
as geography, sociology and epidemiology to measure spatial e®ects.13 We report both dispersion
and correlation, for each decade, and compare them to the model simulation results in section 5.
3.3 Direct evidence about changes in beliefs
Survey responses Our empirical measure of beliefs is survey responses from 1930-2005. The
precise wording of the survey question varies between four di®erent surveys (see appendix B.2 for
details and sources). But all of these surveys ask men and women whether they believe that a
married woman { some are speci¯c to a woman with children, or preschool-aged children { should
participate in the labor force.
Figure 3 displays the fraction of survey respondents supportive of female employment. It rises
over time, in an S-shape pattern that mimics the participation rate. Of course, this does not prove
12Several di®erent data sets were used in the construction of the panel data of the control variables. Details are in
table 2 of the appendix. Table 3 presents the summary statistics for each decade.
13While these other literatures frequently try to identify a causal relationship that drives spatial correlation, we
make no such attempt here. In both the model and the data, issues like Manski (1993) re°ection problems arise. We


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: The fraction of survey respondents supportive of female employment.
Details of the survey questions are in appendix B.2.
that changes in beliefs caused participation to rise. It could be that people report more support for
participation when they see participation rise. However, Farre and Vella (2007) show that women
who have more positive responses are more likely to work and more likely to have daughters that
work. Causal or not, this is direct evidence that beliefs did change in the way the model predicts.
Ancestry Evidence An empirical literature identi¯es variation in preferences and beliefs that
are in°uenced by one's society as an important factor in explaining the large di®erences in women's
labor force participation. Fern¶ andez and Fogli (2005) study the working behavior of second gen-
eration American women to isolate the e®ect of preferences and beliefs from that of markets and
institutions (see also Antecol (2000), Fortin (2005) and Alesina and Giuliano (2007)). They show
that the geographic heritage of these women, as captured by the aggregate labor force of the country
of origin of their parents, is signi¯cant in explaining their labor force participation behavior and ¯nd
these results to be even stronger when the women live in an ethnically dense neighborhood. These
results suggest that preferences/beliefs matter for women's participation and that these beliefs are
in°uenced by the parents and local society.
4 Calibration
To explore the quantitative predictions of our theory, we calibrate the economy to reproduce some
key aggregate statistics in the 1940's and then compare its evolution over time and across regions
18with the data. Because we have census data every 10 years, we consider a period in the model to be
10 years. There are 3025 counties because this is the closest square number to the actual number
of U.S. counties (3074). 100 women live in each county. We focus on the dynamics generated by
local interactions alone and abstract from changes due to wages, wealth and technology, by holding
the costs and bene¯ts of maternal employment ¯xed over time. Table 1 summarizes our calibrated
parameters.
We construct initial 1930 participation to have a geographic pattern that resembles the U.S.
data. This enables us to start with reasonable initial dispersion and spatial correlation. Initial
participation rates a®ect subsequent local participation because they determine the probability of
observing an informative signal. Appendix C o®ers additional detail about the calibration targets
and initial conditions.
mean log ability ¹a -0.90 women's 1940 earnings distribution
std log ability ¾a 0.57 women's 1940 earnings distribution
mean log endowment ¹! -0.28 average endowment = 1
std log endowment ¾! 0.75 men's 1940 earnings distribution
true value of nurture µ 0.04 children's test scores (Bernal and Keane 2006)
radius of interaction d 2 40 miles
outcomes observed J 4 growth of LFP in 1940's
prior mean µ ¹0 0.04 unbiased beliefs
prior std µ ¾0 0.76 average 1940 LFP level
utility of leisure L 0.3 1940 LFP of women without kids
risk aversion ° 3 commonly used
Table 1: Parameter values for the simulated model and the calibration targets.
Wages and endowments The ability and endowment distributions in our model match the
empirical distributions of annual labor income of full-time employed, married women with children
under age 5 and their husbands. We match the moments for 1940, the earliest year for which we have
wage data. Since we interpret women's endowment ! as being husbands' earnings, and earnings
are usually described as log-normal, we assume ln(!) » N(¹!;¾2
!). We normalize the average
endowment (not in logs) to 1 and use ¾! to match the dispersion of 1940 annual log earnings of
husbands with children under 5. For the mean ¹a and standard deviation ¾a of women's ability,
19we match the censored distribution of working women's earnings in the ¯rst period of the model to
the censored earnings distribution in the 1940 data. Our estimates imply that full-time employed
women earn 81% of their husbands' annual earnings, on average.14
True value of nurture Our theory is based on the premise that the e®ect of mothers' employ-
ment on children is uncertain. This is realistic because only in the last 10 years have researchers
begun to agree on the e®ects of maternal employment in early childhood. Harvey (1999) summa-
rizes studies on the e®ects of early maternal employment on children's development that started
in the early 60s and °ourished in the 1980s when the children of the women interviewed in the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth reached adulthood. She concludes that working more hours
is associated with slightly less cognitive development and academic achievement, before age 7.
More recent work con¯rms this ¯nding (Hill, Waldfogel, Brooks-Gunn, and Han 2005). Combining
Bernal and Keane (2006)'s estimates of the reduction in children's test scores from full-time mater-
nal employment of married women with estimates of the e®ect of these test scores on educational
attainment and on expected wages (Goldin and Katz 1999), delivers a loss of 4% of lifetime income
from maternal employment (µ = 0:04).
Information parameters Without direct observable counterparts for our information variables,
we need to infer them from participation data. Initial beliefs are assumed to be the same for all
women and unbiased, implying ¹0 = µ. The alternative, a theory driven by initially biased beliefs,
is di±cult to rationalize. The same bias would have to be present in every country; otherwise,
female labor force participation would start out high and decrease in some countries.
Initial uncertainty ¾0 is chosen to match women's 1940 average labor force participation rate in
the U.S.. Of course, 1940 participation decisions depend not only on initial uncertainty, but also
on the number of signals that women use to update those beliefs J. We choose J to match the
aggregate growth in labor force participation between 1940 and 1950.
14A wage gap where women earn 81% of their husbands' income is higher than most estimates. This is due to
two factors. First, we do not require husbands to be full-time workers because we want to capture the reality that
women's endowments can be high or low. Second, poor women are more likely to be employed. By comparing only
husbands of employed women to their wives, we are selecting poorer husbands.
20The distance of social interaction d is di±cult to calibrate because the model results are not
very sensitive to it. We use a value that is equivalent to 40 miles because spatial correlation drops
o® quickly beyond that distance. To map this physical distance into the model, we use our county
location data to ask: For an average county, how many other counties have centroids within 40
miles of its centroid? The answer is approximately eight. Therefore, we set d in the model to the
length of 2 counties, so that eight neighboring county centriods are located within that radius.
Preference parameters Risk aversion ° is 3, a commonly used value. We also add one new
parameter, a value for leisure L, to give women without children some reason not to participate.
For women who remain out of the labor force, expected utility is now EUO (as in equation 7), plus
L. We calibrate L such that a woman who knows for sure that µ = 0, (because she has no child
who could be harmed by her employment) participates with a 60% probability, just like women
without children in 1940. The exogenous L parameter explains why some women without children
do not work. Our theory explains the di®erence between women with and without children.
Alternative parameter values and model timing Appendix D shows that moderate di®er-
ences in calibrated parameters do not overturn our results. The exact value of the true µ, even a
zero or negative value, has only a modest e®ect on the participation rate that the model converges
to at the end. The radius of social interaction d can be doubled or halved, with no perceptible
di®erences in the results. Replacing some of the initial uncertainty with pessimism (lowering ¾,
lowering ¹0) slows learning initially. Even optimism can be o®set with initial uncertainty. Increas-
ing the number of signals J speeds the transition but does not change the participation level that
the model converges to.
The appendix also explores more signi¯cant changes to the model. One extension allows for
women with many types (di®erent µ's); the same dynamic emerges, even when women observe more
outcomes and aggregate information. Another extension changes the model timing: Women spend
25 years growing up and 10 years having children under age 5.
215 Simulation Results
This section compares the model's predictions for labor force participation rates to the data { ¯rst
the time series and then the geography. Finally, it examines wage and wealth predictions.
5.1 Time Series Results































Figure 4: Aggregate level, cross-county heterogeneity and spatial correlation of female labor force
participation: data and calibrated model. See section 3 for the construction of dispersion and
spatial correlation measures.
By itself, learning can generate a large increase in labor force participation (¯gure 4). By 2010,
our model predicts a 41% participation rate. While this falls short of the 62% rate observed in
the 2005 data, the model is missing features like increasing wages, a decline in the social stigma
associated with female employment and changes in household durable technologies. One indicator
of the size of these e®ects is the increase in the participation rate of women without children. While
56% of these women participated in 1940, 85% participated in 2005, a 29% increase. If the changes
that a®ected all women were added to the learning e®ects speci¯c to mothers of small children that
this model captures, the results would more than account for the full increase. Yet, the results
suggest that up to 2/3rds of the increase in participation could be due to learning.
Participation rises slowly at ¯rst, just like in the data. But, the model does not match the
sudden take o® in the 1970's. Participation growth is governed by three key parameters: First,
the number of signals observed J matters because more signals means faster learning and faster
22participation growth. Second, the amount of noise in each signal ¾a matters because noisy signals
slow down learning. Third, the initial degree of uncertainty matters because more uncertain agents
weight new information more and thus their beliefs change quickly. This also speeds the transition.
5.2 Geographic Results
The most novel results of our model are the geographic ones. While models have not attempted to
match these facts, they provide clues about how the female labor force transition took place. The
right two panels of ¯gure 4 plot our two geographic measures, dispersion and spatial correlation,
for the model and the data.
The \LFP dispersion" measure captures the heterogeneity of participation rates across counties.
In both the model and the data, the level of dispersion is similar and is humped-shaped; it rises
then falls. For the model, the fall is tiny in year 2000 and only becomes noticeable later. The
pronounced drop in dispersion in the 2000 data is partly due to missing county data for that year.
See appendix B for a discussion.
Dispersion rises because of the information externality: Regions that initially have high par-
ticipation generate more informative signals that cause regional participation to rise more quickly.
Regions with low participation have slower participation growth; with few women working, not
enough information is being generated to cause other women to join the labor force. Later in the
century, dispersion falls. This happens because beliefs are converging to the truth. Since di®erences
in beliefs generate dispersion, resolving those di®erences reduces dispersion.
The second measure is spatial correlation, as de¯ned in (10). This measures how similar a
location is to nearby locations and captures the strength of the information externalities. Spatial
correlation also rises, then falls. The increase comes from the the information externality. Initially,
this e®ect is weak because when few women work, information is scarce. In the long run, this e®ect
diminishes because once most information has di®used throughout the economy, the remaining
cross-country di®erences are due to ability and endowments, which are spatially uncorrelated. The
middle of the transition is when correlation is strongest. Nothing in the calibration procedure
ensures that dispersion or spatial correlation looks like the data, after 1930. Therefore, these
23patterns are supportive of the model's mechanism.
5.3 Selection E®ects on Wealth and Wages
The speed at which women switch from staying at home to joining the labor force depends not
just on their location, but also on their socioeconomic status. There are two components to this
status: a woman's own wage and her endowment. Figure 5 shows the mean endowment and wage
of a woman, relative to her husband, for employed women. In both the model and the data,
wages are censored; they are only measured for the subset of women who participate. The model's
unconditional distribution of endowments and abilities is constant. What is changing is the selection
of women who work. In other words, this is primarily a selection e®ect.
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Figure 5: Average endowment and relative wage for working women, belief disper-
sion for all women.
Average relative wage is the woman's wage divided by her husband's wage (wit=!it), averaged over all employed
women. Belief dispersion is std(¹i;t), taken in each period t over all women i.
Employed women's endowments are low at the start of the sample since many women joined the
labor force because they are poor and desperate for income. As women learn and employment poses
less of a risk, less poor women also join. The average endowment of working women rises. This
prediction distinguishes our theory from others. For example, since women with larger endowments
can a®ord new appliances and child care ¯rst, technology-based explanations predict that richer
women join ¯rst.
The ¯nding that women's relative wages declined in the early part of the sample is supported
by O'Neill (1984) who documents a widening of the male-female wage gap in the mid-50's to 70's.
24She attributes it to the same selection e®ects that operate in our model: Not only are husbands of
employed women becoming richer, less skilled women are also entering the labor force. One reason
that women worked at the start of the sample was that they were very highly skilled. Those women
earned high wages. As learning made employment more attractive, less skilled women joined as
well, lowering the average wage women earn.
Belief heterogeneity and measurement error One question that remains is: Why do en-
dowments fall and relative wages rise at the end of the sample? This small e®ect is not simulation
error; extending the simulation a few more decades reveals this is a persistent trend. Instead, the
answer lies in the heterogeneity of beliefs.
The cross-sectional dispersion of both means and variances of beliefs about µ rises initially
as women in di®erent locations see varying amounts of information and signal realizations. But
as information accumulates, beliefs converge to the truth, uncertainty converges to zero and belief
dispersion falls. This matters for the relationship between aggregate variables in the model because
belief dispersion is a source of unmeasured heterogeneity that a®ects participation decisions. In
other words, it acts like noise in an estimation and makes variables look less related.
Starting in 1990, di®erences in women's participation decisions are driven less by di®erences
in beliefs, which are starting to converge, and more by di®erences in endowments and abilities.
Thus, the endowment and wage selection e®ects become stronger again. This ¯nding o®ers a
warning about interpreting a wide range of statistics concerning female labor force participation. If
there are signi¯cant changes in belief heterogeneity that a®ect participation over the 20th century,
many estimated relationships between participation and other economic determinants of labor force
participation will be biased.
Rising unconditional wages While learning o®ers one explanation for wage changes, there are
obviously other factors external to the model that have contributed to this trend. But feeding
the time series of wages in to the model has a negligible e®ect. Wage-based theories rely on
mechanisms that raise labor supply elasticity to make wages matter. Our model has no such
25mechanism. Learning makes elasticity even lower because heterogeneity in beliefs makes fewer
women marginal workers. The next section illustrates how rising wages and learning can interact.
6 Extending the model: wages and career choice
The increase in female labor force participation is not the only phenomenon that might be in°uenced
by local information and that has rich geographic patterns. Many types of social change could be
modeled using this type of framework. To give a sense of how this model framework might be used
to address a broader set of issues, we illustrate one direction in which the model could be extended.
This extension examines women's career choice.
Model The timing, the number of agents and preferences are the same as in the standard model.
What di®ers is that a woman has an additional career option. If she chooses a high-intensity career,
she gets a known multiple ~ w > 1 of her baseline wage, but may further compromise her ability to
nurture her child. Agents learn about two unknown parameters: the value of nurture µ and the toll
on a child of high-intensity maternal employment ~ µ.
The budget constraint of the individual from family i born at time t ¡ 1 is
cit = (nit + hit ~ w)wit + !it (11)
where hit 2 f0;1g indicates the choice of a high-intensity career; !it is an endowment which could
represent a spouse's income, and nit 2 f0;1g is the choice to join a low-intensity career. If the
agent works in the labor force, nit = 1. If she works in a high intensity career, hit = 1. A woman
can only have one career: nit + hit · 1.
As before, endowed ability is ai;t » N(¹a;¾2
a). If a mother stays home with her child, the child's
full natural ability is achieved. If the mother chooses a low-intensity career, some unknown amount
µ of the child's ability will be lost; for a high-intensity career, the loss is ~ µ > µ:
wi;t = exp(ai;t ¡ ni;t¡1µ ¡ hi;t¡1~ µ): (12)
26The constants µ and ~ µ are not known when making labor supply decisions. Initial beliefs are
µ » N(¹0;¾2
0) and ~ µ » N(~ ¹0; ~ ¾2
0), where (¹0 ¡µ) and (~ ¹0 ¡ ~ µ) are independent. The high-intensity
career is initially thought to be more costly (~ ¹0 > ¹0) and more risky (~ ¾2
0 > ¾2
0). Each generation
updates beliefs using Bayes law (4 and 5) and by observing wages and nurturing decisions for
themselves and for the same set Ji of peers as in the original model. Ability a is never observed so
that neither µ, nor ~ µ can be perfectly inferred from the wage. An important feature of (12) is that
a wage wi;t is only informative about ~ µ if the mother had an intense career (hi;t¡1 = 1).
Discussion of model results Since the high-intensity career is initially more uncertain, few
women participate in it initially. Thus, for moderate levels of the wage premium, the early partic-
ipators are primarily in low-intensity (regular) careers. Since high-intensity participation takes o®
later, the composition of careers changes over time. The growth in the fraction of employed women
participating in high-intensity careers increases the average wage of working women. This could be
one component of the explanation for a rise in female wages and its geographic patterns.
Women who work in the high-intensity sector early on are the highest-ability women. Because
we assumed a multiplicative wage premium, high-ability women earn more additional income from
high-intensity careers. Thus as women learn faster in some regions than in others, the degree of
occupation sorting will diverge and then converge again as information di®uses and beliefs converge
to the truth. Appendix H details the basic results, analytically and numerically.
7 Conclusion
Many changes have contributed to the increase in female labor force participation over the last
century. We do not argue that beliefs were the only relevant change. Rather, the model abstracts
from other changes to focus on how the transition from low to high participation can be regulated
by learning in a way that matches the time-series and geographic data. Including local information
transmission as part of the story of female labor force participation in the 20th century helps to
explain its gradual dynamic and geographic evolution.
While this paper used the evolution of geographic heterogeneity of the labor force transition
27to evaluate the strength of the information transmission channel, another empirical exercise could
examine the e®ect of policy changes. Consider a policy designed to encourage maternal employment,
but whose true e®ect on the cost and bene¯t of employment is uncertain. Upon policy passage,
uncertainty would dampen the e®ect on participation. However, women in regions with higher
participation would observe more outcomes that were informative about the policy's e®ect and
would increase their participation faster than regions with initially low participation. Exploring
this prediction could lend additional support to the model.
One direction to extend the theoretical framework is to think more broadly about how social
change arises. One important feature of social behavior that this model does not capture is the desire
to ¯t in or coordinate with others. Using an objective function like that in beauty contest games
(Morris and Shin 2002), coupled with the geographic nature of information transmission, could
provide a rich set of testable implications. Speci¯cally, it could predict geographic patterns, like
the spread from urban to rural areas, in the types of cultural changes investigated by Greenwood
and Guner (2005), Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006) and Bisin and Verdier (2001). Such
work could help di®erentiate exogenous changes in preferences from information-driven changes in
coordination outcomes.
Another direction one could take this model is to interpret the concept of distance more broadly.
Arguably, socioeconomic, ethnic, religious or educational di®erences create stronger social barriers
between people than physical distance does. If that is the case, the learning dynamics that arise
within each social group may be quite distinct. If the initial conditions in these social groups di®er,
changes in labor force participation, career choice, or social norms may arise earlier in one group
than in another. This model provides a vehicle for thinking about the di®usion of new behaviors,
with uncertain consequences, among communities of people.
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31Nature or Nurture: Technical Appendix
A Proofs of analytical results
A.1 Derivation of comparative statics
Step 1: De¯ne a cuto® wage ¹ w such that all women who observe wi;t > ¹ w choose to join the labor force. A
woman joins the labor force when EUWit ¡ EUOit > 0. Note that @Ni;t=@wit = (nitwit + !it)¡° > 0.
Since Ni;t is monotonically increasing in the wage w, there is a unique ¹ w for each set of parameters, such
that at w = ¹ w, Ni;t = 0.
Step 2: Describe the probability of labor force participation. Let © denote the cumulative density function
for the unconditional distribution of wages in the population. This is a log-normal c.d.f. Since the
lognormal is unbounded and has positive probability on every outcomes, its c.d.f. is therefore strictly
increasing in its argument. Then, the probability that a woman participates is 1 ¡ ©( ¹ w), which is then
strictly decreasing in ¹ w.
Step 3: The e®ect of mean beliefs on labor force participation. Taking the partial derivative of the net
utility gain from labor force participation yields @Ni;t=@¹i;t = ¡¯. By the implicit function theorem,
@ ¹ w=@¹i;t > 0. Thus, @(1 ¡ ©( ¹ w))=@¹i;t = (@(1 ¡ ©( ¹ w))=@ ¹ w)(@ ¹ w=@¹i;t) < 0.
Step 4: Calculate the e®ect of uncertainty on labor force participation. The bene¯t to participating is
falling in uncertainty: @Ni;t=@¾i;t = (1 ¡ °)¯ exp
¡




. Since ° > 1,
¯ > 0 by assumption, and the exponential term must be non-negative, this means that @Ni;t=@¾2
i;t < 0. As
before, the implicit function theorem tells us that @ ¹ w=@¾2
i;t > 0. Thus,
@(1 ¡ ©( ¹ w))=@¾2
i;t = (@(1 ¡ ©( ¹ w))=@ ¹ w)(@ ¹ w=@¾2
i;t) < 0.
A.2 Proof of result 1: Zero participation is not a steady state
Proof: For any arbitrary beliefs ¹jt, ¾jt and endowment !jt, there is some ¯nite level of ability a¤ and an
associated wage w¤ = exp(a¤), such that EUWit > EUOit > 0, 8ajt ¸ a¤. The fact that ajt is normally
distributed means that Prob(ajt ¸ a¤) > 0 for all ¯nite a¤. Since woman j enters the labor force whenever
EUWit > EUOit > 0, and this happens with positive probability, njt = 1 with positive probability. Since
this is true for all women j, it is also true that
P
j njt ¸ 1 with positive probability.
A.3 Proof of result 2: Geographic correlation
Let ® be the fraction of women who participate in family i's region. The region a woman lives in does not
a®ect her endowments or ability. Therefore, Ni;t+1 can be rewritten, using (7) and (8) as





for positive constants A and B. Since woman born at time t participates if Ni;t+1 > 0, if su±ces to show
that @Ni;t+1=@® > 0, for a woman with average prior beliefs and an average signal.
The number of informative signals that a woman in family i, with an average signal draw, would see is
¹ nit = ®J. Since beliefs and signals are unbiased by construction, then a woman with average prior beliefs
has ¹it = µ and a woman with an average signal has ^ ¹it = µ. By equation (4), her posterior belief is
¹i;t+1 = µ, for any fraction ®. Her posterior precision does depend on ®: According to equation 5, the
de¯nition of ^ ¾2




i;t + ®J=¾a. Since J and ¾a are both
positive, posterior precision is increasing in ®. Thus, posterior variance ¾2
i;t+1 is decreasing in ®, and Ni;t+1
is increasing in ®.
iB Data: Sources and De¯nitions
B.1 County-level data
County-level data come from come from \Historical, Demographic, Economic, and Social Data: The
United States, 1790-2000" produced by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research
(series 2896). This data set is a consistency-checked and augmented version of the the Integrated Public
Use Microdata series, produced by the Minnesota Population Center. Table 2 lists the demographic,
industrial and occupation control variables and their data sources. Table 3 documents their summary
statistics, by decade.
The matrix of distances between county centroids is the \ground distance circle" that comes from CDA
Transportation Network.
Missing observations One data issue we were concerned with was potential bias in our estimates
from excluding counties with missing data. We also did not control for wages because that data was so
scarce. As can be seen in table 3, we are missing the sectoral composition for some counties in 1940 and in
2000. We are also missing 7 observations on education in 1950. We re-calculate the residuals from the
regression LFPit = ¯1t + ¯2tcontrolsit + ²it, excluding sectoral composition and wages and found no
discernable di®erence between the properties of these residuals and those from an unbalanced panel, with
one exception. In 2000, many counties are missing entries for the industrial sector. When we balanced the
panel by excluding industrial sector data for all years and recovered the additional counties for 2000, the
spatial correlation measure rose from 0.38 to 0.45. It is possible that spatial correlation rose because of
spatial correlation in industrial sector composition that is now attributed to information. However, the
correlation did not rise (in the ¯rst two signi¯cant digits) in the previous decades when industrial sectors
were excluded. This suggests that most of the variation in sectors is also captured by occupational and
demographic variables and that the change in correlation is due to the sparser data available in 2000.
Therefore, we use the higher estimate, on the full sample of data for the 2000 spatial correlation estimate
in ¯gure 4.
B.2 Survey data
The survey data from GSS begin only in 1972. However, the increasing speed of female entry in the labor
force (start of the S) precedes that date. To establish the contemporaneous S-shaped evolution of beliefs, it
is vital to have more historical data. We have one measure of beliefs that is collected infrequently, since the
1930's. This data are from IPOLL databank, maintained by the Roper Center for Public Opinion
Research. Unfortunately, the phrasing of the questions di®ers slightly over time. We describe below the
questions and the replies.
August 1936 The Gallup Poll asked: \Should a married woman earn money if she has a husband capable
of supporting her?" 18% said yes, 82% no. No uncertain or no response entries were allowed.
October 1938 The Gallup Poll asked: \Do you approve of a married woman earning money in business
or industry if she has a husband capable of supporting her?" 22% approve, 78% disapprove.
November 1945 The Gallup Poll (AIPO) asked: \Do you approve or disapprove of a married woman
holding a job in business and industry if her husband is able to support her?" 62% disapprove, 18%
approve. The rest of the replies are miscellaneous open answers (e.g., if she has a good job, if she has
no children, etc.).
June 1970 The Gallup Poll asked: \Do you approve of a married woman earning money in business or
industry if she has a husband capable of supporting her?" 60% approve, 36% disapprove, 4% do not
know.
iiFrom 1977 on, data come from http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/GSS/. The question is: Do you agree with
the following statement: A preschool child is likely to su®er if his or her mother works. (Strongly agree=1,
agree=2, diagree=3, strongly disagree=4, don't know=8, no answer=9, na=0). The only modi¯cation we
make is to treat \don't know" and \na" replies as missing observations. There are 14 observations, one in
1977, and then at least every two years from 1995-2004. There are between 890 and 2,344 responses per
year, totalling 19,005 observations. The average reply ranges from 2.2 in 1977 to 2.6 in 2004.
Merging the two data series: From the Roper data, there are 3 observations available before 1967 and then
regular observations starting in 1970. For each of the pre-1977 observations, we compute the growth rate
from one data point to the next. Then, we apply these same growth rates to project our preschool data
back from 1977 to the earlier observations. We believe that using one series to infer another is a reasonably
accurate procedure because for years in which both survey questions are asked, the correlation in the
replies is 0.75.
C Calibration
Throughout, we look at women 25-54, with their own child younger than 5 living in the household. We use
whites not living in an institution or on a farm, and not working in agriculture. The time-series data we
have from the census is much more detailed than the county-level data. That additional detail allows us to
distinguish which women are married with children under ¯ve. Since it is these women our theory is
oriented toward, it makes sense to compare the model results to this restricted sample of women. But in
the county data, we only have participation rates for all women. Therefore, we adjust all the county data
by a decade-speci¯c scaling factor that is the ratio of the participation rate of all women in the census data
to the participation rate of married mothers with children under ¯ve in the census. This re-scaling ensures
that the average participation rate across counties is the aggregate participation rate in each decade.
Abilities The distribution of women's abilities is constructed so that their wages in the model match the
distribution of women's wages in the 1940 census data. ¾a = :57 is the standard deviation of log
ability and ¹a = ln(earnings gap) ¡ (¾2
a)=2 is the mean of log ability. These parameters target the
initial ratio between average earnings of working women and average earnings of all husbands (0.8 in
the data) and target the standard deviation of log earnings of employed women in the data (0.53).
Selection e®ects in the model The distribution of observed wages in the data needs to be matched
with the distribution of wages for employed women in the model. Employed women are not a
representative sample. They are disproportionately high-skill women. The calibration deals with this
issue by matching the truncated distribution of wages in the data to the same truncated sample in
the model. In other words, we use the model to back out how much selection bias there is.
Endowment distribution Data come from the census. We use husbands' wages in 1940 (¯rst available
year). From this, we construct two pools of matched data: One is only married women; the other is
their husbands.
The log endowment is normal. For these two sets of wage data, we take the log of wages over
previous year. For husbands, mean(log incwage husb ) = 7:04 and std(log incwage husb) = 0:73.
Therefore, we set ¾! = 0:73. We choose the mean log endowment ¹! = ¡(¾2
!)=2 such that mean
endowment is normalized to 1.
True value of nurture To calibrate the µ parameter, we use micro evidence on the e®ect of maternal
employment on the future earnings of children. Our evidence on the e®ect of maternal employment
comes from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), in particular the Peabody Picture
Vocabulary Test (PPVT) at age 4 and the Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT) for math
and reading recognition scores measured at age 5 and 6. One year of full time maternal employment
plus informal day care reduces test scores by roughly 3.4% (Bernal and Keane 2006). If a mother
works from one year after birth until age six, these ¯ve years of employment translate in to a score
reduction of 17%.
iiiThe childhood test scores are signi¯cantly correlated with educational attainment at 18. A 1%
increase in the math at age 6 is associated with .019 years of additional schooling. A 1% increase in
the reading test score at age 6 is associated with .025 additional school years. Therefore, ¯ve years of
maternal employment translates into between 0.32 (17*.019) and 0.42 (17*.025) fewer years of school.
The ¯nal step is to multiply the change in educational attainment by the returns to a college
education. We use the returns to a year of college from 1940 to 1995 from Goldin and Katz (1999).
Their estimates are the composition-adjusted log weekly wage for full-time/full-year, non
agricultural, white males. Those estimates are 0.1, 0.077, 0.091, 0.099, 0.089, 0.124, and 0.129 for the
years 1939, 1949, 1959, 1969, 1979, 1989, and 1995. The average return to a year of college is 10%.
Since maternal employment reduces education by 0.32-0.42 years, the expected loss in terms of
foregone yearly log earnings is about 4%, or µ = 0:04.
Number of signals J is calibrated to get the aggregate labor force participation to rise from 6% in 1940
to 10% in 1950.
Initial Participation in 1930 (heterogeneous across regions) We want to preserve some of the
spatial information in our data. However, the model is on a square grid. Mapping irregular-sized US
counties onto this grid is a challenge. To do this, we used regions, which are larger than counties.
Regions are constructed by taking the 48 contiguous states, computing the county centroid with the
highest and the lowest longitude (call the di®erence between the maximum and minimum lodist),
and dividing the US map into n vertical strips, each with width lodist=n. Then, for each strip, we
compute the maximum and minimum latitude, and divide the strip into n boxes of equal height. We
choose n = 10 because it is the largest possible number that does not result in there being boxes
containing no county centroids.
In the model, we divide the evenly-spaced agents into 100 regions of equal size and population. For
each of these 100 regions, we assign the participation rate of the corresponding box on the U.S. map
and assign agents randomly to participate or not. Each participates with a probability given by the
regional participation rate. After calibrating initial participation, this regional aggregation structure
is never used again and we compute statistics at the more local, county level.
D Robustness Checks
Increasing the number of signals makes agents learn faster and makes participation rise faster, while
reducing the number of signals has the opposite e®ect (panel A). Eliminating the cost of maternal
employment increases the ending participation rate moderately, while doubling the cost lowers it (panel B).
Making agents more uncertain and more optimistic initially about the costs of labor force participation has
very little e®ect on the model. The reverse, lowering uncertainty but raising the estimated cost of maternal
employment has a net positive e®ect on participation, in the ¯rst few decades (panel C). Doubling or
halving the distance of social interaction has no perceptible e®ect on participation (panel D).
E Model with Multiple Types of Women
This extension of the model introduces multiple types of women with di®erent µ's. The idea is that women
need to observe other women like themselves to determine what the cost of maternal employment is for
their type. Professionals do not learn from seeing hourly workers. A female doctor who is on call all night
does not learn about her µ from seeing the children of 9-5 workers, and urban mothers face di®erent
challenges and costs from rural ones. In this richer model, women can observe many more signals as well as
aggregate information and still learn slowly about the µ for their type.
The model is the same as the benchmark except for the following changes. Suppose there are ­ di®erent
types of women, indexed by !. A woman of type ! has a cost of maternal employment µ! » N(¹ µ;¾2
µ),
where the µ's are i.i.d. across types. A woman's type ! is publicly observable.












































































































































Figure 6: Robustness exercises.
Note that women now know the true cost of maternal employment for the average woman, ¹ µ. Therefore,
new research, magazine articles, or aggregate statistics contain no new information. Instead of learning
about what the cost of maternal employment is for the average woman, this woman is now learning about
how the cost of maternal employment for her type of woman di®ers from that average.
Simulation results We use the same calibration as the benchmark model, except that there are now 5
types of women, with µ!'s equally spaced between 0:3 and 0:5. Each woman observed 20 signals and knew
that the true mean of µ across all types was 0:4. The results in ¯gure 7 are almost indistinguishable from
those of the benchmark model (¯gure 4).

















Figure 7: Labor force participation with multiple types of women who observe ag-
gregate information.
F Model with Learning from Others' Choices
To keep the model simple and tractable, we assumed that women do not draw any inference from the labor
decisions of other women. They use the knowledge of whether J of their peers were nurtured in order to
estimate the cost of maternal employment. But they do not take advantage of the fact that the mother's
vemployment decision reveals something about the mother's beliefs, which is additional information about
the true value of nurture µ.
This section shows that our simplifying assumption is innocuous. Seeing other women's labor force
decisions does not signi¯cantly speed up learning for ¯ve reasons: 1) Participation is a binary choice. The
binary nature of the signal eliminates much of its information. 2) Early on, most women do not work and
other women expect that the women they encounter will likely not work. Therefore, a woman who observes
another woman not working early in the century gets very little new (unexpected) information. Observing
working women is informative but it becomes commonplace only later in the century when most of the
learning has been completed. 3) Women observe the participation decisions of women from the previous
cohort. Those women were less informed and less likely to work. 4) The \noise" in women's participation
decisions is large. Women don't know others' ability, don't know whether the mother was nurtured, and
don't know how uncertain they were. Through all this noise, the belief about the mean is a weak signal. 5)
The beliefs of others in your region are highly correlated with your own beliefs because people in the same
region see common signals. A correlated signal contains less information than an independent one.
To quantify these claims, we simulate an economy that is an approximation to the economy where women
learn from the decisions of other women. To keep the linear Bayesian updating rules, we consider an
economy where women observe additional normally distributed signals whose signal-to-noise ratio is the
same as the information embedded in the participation decisions they observe. This is an upper bound on
how much additional information comes from others' decisions because normally distributed signals contain
more information than any other kind of signal with the same signal-to-noise ratio (Cover and
Thomas 1991).
To estimate the signal-to-noise ratio of women's employment decisions, run a regression of participation on
beliefs. Since the informativeness of women's labor decisions changes over time, there should be a separate
regression run for each decade. Compute the R2. The signal-to-noise ratio, the ratio of the explained sum
of squares (signal) to unexplained (noise), is R2=(1 ¡ R2). To construct a signal with the same amount of
noise, ¯rst compute the cross-sectional variance of women's beliefs. This is the total sum of squares.
Multiply this variance by 1 ¡ R2 to get the unexplained sum of squares. Create an m £ 1 vector of i.i.d.
normal random variables with mean zero and variance (1 ¡ R2)var(¹t), where m is the number of women
in the economy. Add this noise shock to the vector of women's beliefs. Each woman in generation t+1 sees
a subset of the signals about generation t beliefs, where the subset is the signals with indices j²Ji.

















Figure 8: Labor force participation when women observe participation decisions of
others.
The time-series of labor force participation that results from simulating this model, with the same
calibrated parameters as in table 1 of the main text, appears in ¯gure 8. This approach generates a labor
force participation rate that is only a couple of percentage points higher at the end of the sample. Thus,
learning from other women's participation choices does speed up the increase in labor force participation
by speeding up learning, but its e®ect is small.
viG Changing Model Timing: 25 years from birth until
motherhood
The model is designed to explain the labor force participation decisions of women with children under 5
years of age. The majority of these women in the census data are between the ages of 25 and 35, with an
average age of 32. This 10-year interval is part of the reason why we look at 10-year periods. Whether
women return to the labor force afterwards or not is not something our theory has anything to say about,
nor is it relevant for the participation rates of our subgroup. What our timing assumptions miss is that it
takes about 25 years between when a girl is born and when she makes her decision about maternal
employment. Therefore, the decisions of mothers determine the information that others observe 25 years,
not 10 years later.
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Figure 9: Results with twenty-five years until motherhood.
Model This model is one where a child grows up for 25 years and realizes her potential wage at 25. At
the same time, the woman marries and starts having children. She is a married woman with a child under
5 years of age until age 35, when she drops out of our sample. We stagger families so that every year an
equal number of children are born. The parameters are all equal to our benchmark parameters. Signals are
drawn from wage and maternal employment decisions of women from the current and last 10 cohorts. The
labor force participation rates in 9 include only the cohorts that are between 25-35 years old.
This model has three features that help to slow the increase in participation. One feature is a longer
childhood. Information generated from a woman participating today will not be revealed for 25 years. A
second feature is that participation rates include not only the current cohort, but also 10 years of older
cohorts who made their participation decisions with less information and are therefore less likely to
participate. A third feature is that signals are drawn from both current and 10 years of past cohorts. The
potential wage and maternal employment decisions of an older woman are less likely to be informative.
What we learn from this is the more realistic modeling of the timing of childbirth and introducing
overlapping cohorts helps to add more persistence to the learning model.
H Occupation Choice Appendix
Allowing women the option to participate in a time-intensive, high-wage career, to have a normal career, or
to nurture children, results in more women choosing the high-wage career over time. As the composition of
career choices changes, wages rise and the labor supply elasticity falls. This appendix details the solution
and calibration of this model extension.
viiEquilibrium Substituting (11) and (12) into expected utility produces the following optimization
problem. Choose nit;hit ² f0;1g : nit + hit · 1 to maximize:









+ (1 ¡ nit ¡ hit)L: (13)
Beliefs µ » N(¹i;t;¾2
i;t) and ~ µ » N(~ ¹i;t; ~ ¾2
i;t) are formed according to the rules in (4) and (5). Because the
unknown components of µ and ~ µ are independent, updating occurs separately for high-intensity and
low-intensity careers. Distributions of observed wage outcomes indexed by Ji;t are consistent with
distribution of optimal labor choices ni;(t¡1) and hi;(t¡1).
Solving the model Bayesian updating with J signals is equivalent to running the following regression
of children's potential wages on mothers' labor choices Wit ¡ ¹a = Nitµ + Hit~ µ + "it, where Wit, Nit and
Hit are J £ 1 vectors flogwj;tgj²Ji, fni;t¡1gj²Ji and fhi;t¡1gj²Ji. Then, agents form a linear combination of
the OLS-estimated ^ µ or ~ µ and the prior beliefs ¹t; ~ ¹t. Let ¹ hi;t be the sum of the high-intensity careers
chosen by the set of families that (i;t) observes: ¹ hi;t =
P
j²Ji hi;t. The resulting estimate of ~ µ is normally
distributed with mean ~ ¹i;t =
P
j²Ji(logwj;t ¡ ¹a)hj;t=¹ hi;t and variance ~ ¾2 = ¾2
a=¹ hi;t.
For each possible career choice, we compute the expectation of (13), conditional on time t information
(¹it;¾it; ~ ¹it; ~ ¾it). The expected value of staying out of the labor force, EUO and of working in a
low-intensity career EUW are given by (7) and (8). The expected utility of a high-intensity career is
EUHit =















The optimal career choice for woman i in generation t is: (i) if EUOit > EUWit and EUOit > EUHit,
then stay home; (ii) if EUWit > EUOit and EUWit > EUHit, then work in a low-intensity career; (iii)
otherwise, if EUHit > EUOit and EUHit > EUWit, then work in a high-intensity career.
Numerical example The census variable OCC1990 de¯nes our high intensity occupations. This
variable starts in 1950 and the earlier classi¯cation (OCC1950) is not comparable. We consider high
intensity the managerial and professional specialty occupation with the exclusion, (following Goldin and
Katz 2002) of non-college teachers and those in health assessment and treating occupations (nurses,
dieticians, therapist, and physicians' assistants).
Duxbury and Higgins (2003) report that along many dimensions, professional careers are about twice as
straining on households. The likelihood of having to do overnight job-related travel increases. 19% of
non-professional and 40% of professional women report spending one night a month away from home. 30%
of non-professional and 60% of professional women bring work home. Finally, non-professional women do
about 11.4 hours of unpaid overtime work per month, while professional women work about 17.7 unpaid
hours.
The new model introduces ¯ve additional parameters: the true cost ~ µ, the initial beliefs ~ ¹0 and ~ ¾0, the
wage premium ~ w and the leisure cost Lhi of high-intensity maternal employment. Based on these facts, we
double the leisure cost Lhi and assuming convex nurture costs, we quadruple the true cost for children
~ µ = 0:16. As before, we calibrate to unbiased initial beliefs (~ ¹0 = ~ µ) and we keep initial uncertainty at the
same level as before (~ ¾0 = 1:38) to match the same target: the initial labor force participation rate among
married women with children under 5, in all careers.
This leaves only the wage premium for high-intensity careers. According to the census, women in the
occupations we categorize as high-intensity earn 30% more, on average. Therefore, we use a 30% wage
premium.
Simulation results In ¯gure 10, labor force participation rises more at the end. The high-intensity
participation rises gradually in the model, like in the data, but overshoots at the end. Women's average





























































Average wage of working women
Figure 10: Participation and wages in the occupation choice model.
wage falls and then rises, although the magnitude is much less than in the data. Although a more careful
calibration is in order before making any conclusions, these results suggest that the power of this
mechanism to explain the rise in wages is quite modest, but its ability to explain trends in occupational
sorting could be substantial.
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